Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir joined thousands of Jewish ultranationalists who demonstrated in front of the Al-Aqsa Compound, one of the most culturally sensitive holy sites in Jerusalem, on Thursday. They were escorted by armed police as they prayed, sang the national anthem, and waved the Israeli flag, a direct challenge to the decades-old "agreement that restricts non-Muslim prayer at Islam’s third-holiest site.

What was intended to be a domestic show of political strength acts internationally as a strategic signal: Israel’s internal rightward pivot is creating growing friction with its primary security partners and regional allies.

A Minister of Extremes

Itamar Ben-Gvir, in particular, is a controversial yet influential figure. As the leader of the ultranationalist and Jewish supremacist Otzma Yehudit (“Jewish Power”) political party, Ben-Gvir’s appointment to the position of Minister of National Security by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu drew immediate criticism from domestic legal authorities and international diplomats.

Despite holding a 63% negative approval rating compared to a 32% positive one among the general populace, Ben-Gvir retains 58% positive approval among right-wing Israelis. His key constituency appears to be hardline religious nationalist voters who approve of his uncompromising stance and see it as a necessary counterweight to traditional establishment politics.

Ben-Gvir’s six Knesset seats also carry a disproportionate weight within Netanyahu’s narrow governing majority, but he cannot fire Ben-Gvir without collapsing his governing coalition, thus allowing disproportionate power to a highly radical coalition that would otherwise be marginalized. However, the rise of politicians like Itamar Ben-Gvir is only one reason behind the degeneration of Israel’s international appearance.

The Police and the West Bank

Ben-Gvir’s appearance alongside numerous hardliners at yesterday’s Tisha B’Av events at the Al-Aqsa/Haram al-Sharif was not just as a politician. As the Minister of National Security, Ben-Gvir is also in charge of the Israel Police. He used that power to replace district commanders in the Jerusalem Police District with ideological allies, changing the police’s duty from preventing non-Muslim prayer to protecting it.

This shift marks one of many institutional “corrections” made by the Netanyahu government toward a further right shift in domestic politics, drawing international concerns over the treatment of non-Jewish minorities. However, aside from the usual risks that come with Ben-Gvir’s majoritarian beliefs, Netanyahu’s courting of such radical figures risks alienating Israel’s already-shaky regional relations.

Alliances In Jeopardy

Firstly, the rising normalization of Jewish ultranationalism places Israel in direct opposition to the ideas of its Muslim neighbors, many of which already carry historical concerns over the idea of a Jewish state.

1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty

The most immediately fragile relationship is the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty (and some earlier historical agreements). Under this treaty, King Abdullah II’s Hashemite dynasty holds official custodianship over Jerusalem’s Islamic and Christian holy sites (via the Jordanian Waqf). But ultranationalist figures like Ben-Gvir outright advocate for the assertion of unilateral Israeli authority over the Temple Mount/Haram Al-Sharif through the use of police forces to escort Jewish prayer groups. This undermines Waqf authority and operationally threatens Jordanian custodianship. Additionally, because Jordan’s population is majority Palestinian, if the King is perceived as failing to protect Islam’s holy sites from the Israelis, it could trigger massive domestic unrest in the nation. So, Amman is forced to adopt a hostile diplomatic stance, which stalls security cooperation and constantly threatens to freeze or downgrade the peace treaty to preserve internal stability.

The Abraham Accords

Another very critical alliance that is under threat is the Abraham Accords, which is a series of historical agreements between Gulf signatories, primarily for technology access, defense trade, and a shared counter-Iran interest. These agreements were premised on the idea that Arab states could decouple their economic and security normalization with Israel from the unresolved Palestine dispute. However, the implicit condition was that Israel would avoid blatant provocations at holy sites or mass West Bank annexations. The disruptions perpetrated by Ben-Gvir and his compatriots make normalization politically toxic for Gulf leaders in the court of Arab public opinion. While the treaties likely won’t be significantly altered overnight, existing signatories like the UAE and Bahrain could freeze high-level diplomatic visits, slow down joint defense projects, and issue strong public condemnations. Then, prospective partners like Saudi Arabia, who have maintained that Palestinian statehood is a prerequisite for formal normalization, would be effectively blocked from accepting any concessions from Israel that would otherwise be needed to sell a normalization deal domestically.

U.S-Israel Bipartisan Alignment

The U.S expects Israel to act as a stable and predictable regional partner. Washington provides Israel with significant military aid and diplomatic defense at the UN, but such protection relies on shared strategic alignment and domestic political consensus, the latter of which is already seeing major structural shifts. The American diplomatic preference for big-picture initiatives (such as countering Iran) is averse to settling localized problems in Jerusalem.

When Israeli coalition partners provoke crises at significant friction points like Al-Aqsa, the U.S State Department is compelled to issue reprimands, which alienates domestic political constituencies in the U.S and distracts from broader diplomatic objectives. The erosion of bipartisan support for Israel in Washington is already accelerating due to a number of factors, and the constant far-right provocations only push this shift further.

Conclusion

With American domestic support for relations with Israel already in severe decline, the latter cannot afford to continue tolerating the aggravations of ultranationalist figures like Itamar Ben-Gvir. Such incitements portray Israel as a liability that threatens U.S regional strategy and force readiness, rather than the strong ally that the foreign policy apparatus has long considered it to be.

Yemeni Houthis have entered the Iran conflict, vowing to blockade the Red Sea and attack Saudi Arabia. A total blockade has yet to be achieved, but the Houthis have successfully launched attacks on the Saudi oil tankers Rubymar and Tutor (Liberian-flagged), as well as various ports and military targets. Though these attacks drew coalition retaliation against Hodeidah and Kamaran Island, the opening of a new front in an already costly and difficult war only pushes the United States into deeper economic and international chaos.

But a new development indicates a much more long-term and dangerous problem for U.S global primacy: Chinese ships are being uniquely allowed to pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Common Anti-Americanism

Since its founding, the Houthi movement has shared a strong anti-American sentiment with various other international players, China later becoming one of them. Though it won’t explicitly call itself so, American protection of Taiwan and alliances with Japan and South Korea (not to mention The Quad, a coalition maintained to counter Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific) have caused deep rifts in U.S-China relations, and the trade war between the two during Donald Trump’s first presidency did not help.

The common enemy, however, has led to expected alliances. The Iranian government has long backed the Houthis to counter the influence of pro-Western Saudi Arabia, and through Iranian membership in BRICS and flourishing diplomacy with China (on the grounds of countering American influence), Iran-China relations have allowed for a direct pathway to Chinese support for the Houthis. It should be noted that the Chinese explicitly deny backing the group, but U.S intelligence reports consistently find Chinese indirect and tactical support, especially through dual-use drone components that the Houthis use for warfare.

The common anti-Americanism between China and the Houthis has led to a very visible relationship that we are now seeing China reap the benefits of during this war. While American ships are being targeted in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical passageway for oil shipping, Chinese ships are being allowed to pass through. Aside from preserving Chinese supply chains while disrupting American ones, imbalancing the two competing economies and tipping the scales in favor of China, there is the problem of visibility.

The Chinese Image

Allowing Chinese ships to pass through a warzone where American ships are being attacked is not a first for this war. Earlier in the war, when Iran attempted to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, an Aframax-class oil tanker named Karachi carrying Das crude from Abu Dhabi to Pakistan was given special passage through the guarded region after its shipment was settled in Chinese yuan instead of the typical U.S dollar. While this instance does not signal a total collapse of the petrodollar, it does indicate a significant erosion in trust. The new problem is where that trust is going.

China has now shown that yuan payments can rival the dollar, its ships can pass through warzones incited by the U.S, and that it is not causing active military conflicts worldwide nearly at the same rate as its main rival. When placing all these developments together, a new picture begins to emerge on the world stage. Is China standing where the United States once stood? If so, where is the U.S now?

Beijing has successfully created the image that it is a far more reliable economic partner and anchor for global peace than the United States, and although no major powers have moved in favor of this image just yet, it is evident that numerous smaller nations are enchanted by the idea of a new world order. One that is not held back (in their view) by modern American volatility.

China appears to be successfully positioning itself as the prime alternative to the U.S as the latter spends itself into oblivion. But with Washington becoming more and more unpredictable on the world stage, will it even be able to deter such a threat?

With President Trump hinting at a deal that may allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium, many questions have arisen regarding the latter’s nuclear capabilities in general. The one that interests us most is: If Saudi Arabia advances to full-blown nuclear production in the near future, what does it mean for the Middle East?

A Middle Eastern Arms Race

For starters, it means conflict. Israel, being the main Western-aligned (though they have recently been pursuing a level of strategic autonomy) nation in the Middle East, would not take well to a Muslim nation acquiring nuclear weaponry. Between Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, this deal would cause the world’s first three-way nuclear standoff.

It should be noted that Saudi Arabia financed Pakistan’s nuclear program in the 1980s and 1990s, and this resulted in an implicit agreement that if Riyadh ever needed off-the-shelf warheads, Islamabad would come to its aid. Combining the American-built domestic enrichment with Pakistani foreign backup effectively gives Saudi Arabia a fast pass to nuclear armament.

Israel would not be the only nation aggravated by such a change, however. Turkey and Egypt will not sit idly by while their two main rivals, Iran and Saudi Arabia, go nuclear. A nuclear Saudi Arabia permanently diminishes global non-proliferation.

A Major Trap For U.S Foreign Policy

Historically, Washington insists on the “Gold Standard” when it helps a foreign nation build civilian nuclear infrastructure (a Section 123 agreement), meaning that the host nation agrees not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel domestically. However, giving Riyadh a pathway to enrich its own uranium severely blurs the line between “peaceful power grid” and “breakout weapons capacity.” This marks the end of the “123 Gold Standard” that America has upheld since signing with the UAE in 2009.

More importantly, though, is the major clash of sovereign and commercial interests. Saudi Arabia was heavily pushed by American nuclear energy titans like Westinghouse, who were eager to capture multi-billion-dollar contracts before China or Russia signed the deal in their place. But by supplying the tech, the U.S unknowingly creates a moral hazard. Washington becomes the ultimate security guarantor of a now-nuclear absolute monarchy, which entangles American military power even deeper into Gulf security right as it becomes crucial to pivot to the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

Many regional divisions will be stirred, and U.S involvement in arming a nation with nuclear capabilities is sure to be met with international pushback. Giving nuclear potential to yet another volatile regional power in conflict with others can only increase the odds of a nuclear war.

The U.S is already under fire across most of the world over the Iran war, and America has not done itself any favors in attempting to move forward with such a non-trivial deal in the middle of global economic turmoil. Washington can no longer act as though it is diplomatically immortal post-Pax Americana, and with the Chinese threat growing, it has never been more important for the United States to be a champion of peace.

Becoming such a champion after so much international provocation, however, will require significant military de-escalation and diplomatic resurgence. Actions that the U.S government does not seem capable of taking at this moment.

The deep post-WWII ties between the U.S and Japan have proven to be one of the strongest American diplomatic relationships in the modern day, and a powerful counterweight to Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific. But a growing frustration with U.S involvement in Japanese politics is beginning to demonstrate that such ties may not have been unbreakable at all. Arguably, one of the groups leading this shift is Nippon Kaigi.

Nippon Kaigi, meaning “Japan Conference,” is a far-right ultranationalist lobbying group that is considered to be one of the most powerful. Of all the politicians to maintain membership in such a group, the most significant is Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. Though Japan maintains democratic freedom of association, and Japanese nationalism is ingrained in the nation’s recent history, such an extreme association could prove problematic for relations with the U.S.

Despite the pro-American foundation of Japan’s current conservative establishment, the previous premiership of now-deceased Shinzo Abe (also a member of Nippon Kaigi) began a shift toward “strategic autonomy” that is being carried on by Takaichi, one of his closest protegès. Both politicians led the moderate right-wing Liberal Democratic Party, but Takaichi’s connection to the even more extreme Nippon Kaigi begs the question: Will Takaichi’s ultranationalism and dedication to Japanese autonomy lead to a decline in relations with the U.S?

After all, the pro-American establishment in Japan was built by Americans themselves after the former fell to the latter in WWII (and lived under American military occupation for nearly seven years). Japanese ultranationalism is mechanically incompatible with the current establishment, and though Nippon Kaigi is not explicitly anti-American (it would be organizational suicide to be so), the natural consequence of their ideology is structural reform to the constitution and a reversal of the pacifist nature of Japanese defense. It would strike a blow to Washington’s power base and would allow a window of opportunity for China to evade Japanese defenses should a conflict over Taiwan break out.

Takaichi’s own policies have already begun to reflect such a shift. Her administration has shifted defense spending to 2% of the GDP and is actively working to transform the Self-Defense Forces into a fully-fledged military. Recent reports also indicate that Japan is constructing a new domestic intelligence agency to centralize intelligence sharing and further protect local supply chains. All signs point to the exact autonomy that Nippon Kaigi wishes Japan to regain, and the Takaichi administration will only accelerate this change.

The Isolationist Perspective: This shift is nothing but positive. Japanese relations with America are virtually unbreakable in the face of Chinese aggression, which both nations wish to counter. Additionally, should Tokyo consolidate greater control over its defense and security, it would take a burden off of the United States and allow it to focus on domestic affairs. In sum, there is an argument to be heard that greater Japanese autonomy could prove to be beneficial for both the American economy and military-industrial complex.

The Interventionist Perspective: Japanese “strategic autonomy” serves not just to improve their own self-determination, but also isolates the U.S in the Indo-Pacific. With nations like India and South Korea (both important opposition to China) also pursuing similar strategic autonomy policies, a lack of direct U.S involvement in deterrence policies could prove to be problematic if a conflict ever broke out. Washington’s role in shutting down such a conflict and maintaining primacy in the Indo-Pacific would diminish in the face of numerous “autonomous actors,” and previous American military dominance would be slightly reduced to diplomatic garden-tending.

So, could Sanae Takaichi’s Nippon Kaigi membership signal a future decline in U.S-Japan relations? At the moment, it’s unlikely. A decline in American dominance is sure to occur, but the relationship between the two Western-aligned nations is very unlikely to falter as long as China maintains its own opposition to the Global North. The American-Japanese alliance seemingly will not fall anytime soon, and though Takaichi hopes to achieve Japanese military independence, Washington will retain numerous opportunities to reap economic benefits from their growing self-determination.

A meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui took place in Moscow on Sunday, July 19, 2026. The Russian President thanked Pyongyang for their support in his war against Ukraine in the latest push for diplomacy between the two nations, Russian state media reported.

The meeting appears to have been held despite no specific occasion and has raised speculation that Choe may be coordinating a possible visit to Russia by North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. North Korean state media reported that she left for Russia on Saturday at the behest of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, but has not yet commented on the purpose of her visit.

In 2024, under a mutual defense pact, North Korean soldiers helped Russian forces repel a Ukrainian invasion into its western Kursk region, significantly bolstering relations between the two. Kim Jong Un, in recent years, has chosen to make Russia a high priority of North Korean foreign policy, sending thousands of soldiers and a hefty supply of weaponry to support Putin’s war in Ukraine (possibly in exchange for economic or technological aid).

Since the collapse of nuclear diplomacy between Kim and the U.S (during the first Trump administration in 2019), he has used Russia’s war on Ukraine as a diversion to accelerate the advancement of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, furthering their increasingly aggressive posturing toward the Western-aligned South Korea.

It should be noted that the Russian Foreign Minister invited his North Korean counterpart as Ukrainian strikes are crippling Russia’s oil refineries and the long-stagnant war appears to tip further in the latter’s favor, but it is unclear whether this meeting occurred because of recent losses or in the interest of long-term relations.